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Abstract. This paper examines how a nationwide infrastructure investment 
policy, implemented at the local level, impacted local crime rates. The policy, 
developed in the wake of the global recession of 2008–09, was designed to boost 
local economies through job creation. Using monthly figures from the more than 
900 municipalities making up the Spanish region of Catalonia, the paper 
exploits spatial and temporal variations in the Spanish Ministry of Public 
Administration’s random approval of local investment policies, to estimate their 
impact on both unemployment and crime. The combination of difference-in-
differences and IV estimates makes it possible to assess both the size and timing 
of the policy’s impact on the local labour market and on municipal-level crime 
rates. While the policy did little to palliate the effects of the economic recession 
in the long run, local public finances did experience a short-term boost, resulting 
in a temporary reduction in local unemployment rates (as required by the 
policy), as well as a significant drop in crime rates. 
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The impact of local development on crime rates is contingent on a range of temporal and spatial 
factors. Indeed, different aspects of local economic activity appear to exert a series of 
counterbalancing forces, with mixed outcomes for crime rates. An examination of Becker’s 
(1968) seminal model in the economics of crime literature shows that rational individuals 
divide their time between legal and illegal ‘work’ (contingent, that is, on a range of factors, 
including the rewards to be gained from such activities, deterrence variables, severity of 
punishment, and personal traits) as they seek to maximize their expected utility. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, all public interventions aimed at boosting labour market opportunities should, in 
principle, reduce crime. 
Yet, the empirical evidence is mixed and contradictory, precisely because of the 
difficulties encountered in accounting for all the potential factors involved. However, by 
employing various mechanisms (directly or indirectly), it is relatively straightforward to 
demonstrate why economic activity, in general, and employment, in particular, may have a 
decisive impact on criminal activity. As Freedman and Owens (2016) report in a study 
conducted in San Antonio (Texas), while employment opportunities are unequally distributed 
among individuals, criminal activity is likely to increase when the earnings of those individuals 
benefiting from an employment program rise (i.e., there is an increase in the supply of criminal 
opportunities) vis-à-vis the earnings of those that do not benefit from the program. However, 
other forces may well be at work; for instance, better employment opportunities could result in 
more people working and, hence, their spending less time at home, thus increasing their 
chances of being burglarized. Moreover, many different forces could be operating 
simultaneously in the relationship between labour market opportunities and crime, with 
counterbalancing effects. For this reason, it is critical to identify adequate, empirical 
specifications that allow us to address the issue at hand, and reveal true causal relationships 
between employment opportunities, local development in general, and criminal activity. In this 
paper, I contribute to this literature by addressing the following research question: Does local 
investment in infrastructure affect local crime rates? To do so, I draw on a unique empirical 
setup that enables me to make causal estimates of the potential relationships involved. 
In December 2008, as a result of the intensifying financial crisis that had been triggered 
three months earlier with the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, and which was characterized by a 
credit crunch, growing uncertainty about the economic outlook, and a severe contraction in 
private demand, the Spanish Central Government opted to implement various urgent, 
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extraordinary measures to boost local economic activity and local employment. The measure 
that captured most of the spotlight was the creation of an €8-billion nationwide public fund – 
the Fondo Estatal de Inversión Local or FEIL (State Fund for Local Investment) – to finance 
local public works infrastructure. The fund was more popularly referred to as Plan E or Plan 
Zapatero.1  
In this paper, using the difference-in-differences technique and an instrumental variable 
methodology, I exploit the Spanish Ministry of Public Administration’s random approval dates 
for these local investment programs to examine how they varied across time and municipalities. 
I use this variability to assess how the upsurge in local economic activity – as a result of higher 
local employment – affects crime. Initially, I draw on monthly data from the Catalan 
municipalities to assess the impact of these local investment programs on unemployment rates. 
Once I have demonstrated that the FEIL indeed affected short-run labour outcomes, I then 
measure the fund’s impact on local crime. I do this by studying all recorded crime incidents 
taken from a geocoded dataset provided by the Catalan Police Department. 
The results show that, in the short run, the FEIL successfully reduced unemployment rates 
– especially among unemployed male construction workers – thus significantly reducing crime. 
A closer look at these results reveals some interesting features. For instance, I find that some 
crime types were significantly reduced during working hours and that the probability of repeat 
offending was lower as a result of the decrease in unemployment rates in the municipalities. 
Moreover, the occurrence of crime incidents matches what I identify as the time profile for the 
impact of different types of local infrastructure projects. 
Examining the effects of local public investment programs on crime is interesting in its 
own right, but the outcomes reported herein should also provide insights for policy makers 
considering the implementation of similar programs in both developed and, more specifically, 
in developing countries around the world. In this regard, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) issued a guide for labour-intensive infrastructure programs (see Bentall, Beusch, and de 
Veen, 1999), recognizing that  
“(w)ell-designed and well-implemented labour-based infrastructure programmes offer specific 
advantages to the social partners (governments, employers and workers) in developing countries 
in terms of improved access to public markets, increased employment and better returns to 
                                                          




investment. Moreover, they provide a good opportunity to each of these partners to incorporate 
social policy objectives into infrastructure investment policies.”2  
This paper aims, therefore, to provide tools that can better define how social policy objectives 
can be targeted via public investment programs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the extensive 
literature on the issue under discussion. Section 3 provides background on the FEIL state fund, 
which is used here as an exogenous source impacting the variation in municipal-level 
unemployment rates. Section 4 gives a detailed description of the dataset used. Section 5 
explains the identification strategy and the methodology employed. Section 6 presents the main 
results of the paper. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
The relationship between labour outcomes and crime has long been of interest in both the 
empirical and theoretical economic literature. From the empirical perspective, unemployment 
became the focus of researchers’ attention in the mid-1980s, when the condition was believed 
to be the key determinant of crime.3 These initial studies indeed showed that high 
unemployment rates were associated with a rise in crime, although the relationship was less 
statistically significant than, for instance, that between the deterrence variables and crime. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence presented was far from conclusive in terms of the robustness 
of the relationship reported (see, for example, Cameron, 1988, and Freeman, 1996, for surveys 
of those initial studies). 
The ambiguity of the outcomes was linked to various factors, including the level of data 
aggregation, the unemployment and criminality measures, and the econometric specification 
employed. Thus, while studies using aggregate time-series and cross-sectional data reported a 
                                                          
2 Specific examples of such programs can be found in many countries, including Mexico, in 2014 
(http://goo.gl/7AU3C7), and India, with the 2006-2008 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (see 
Zimmermann, 2015). A further example is provided by the program implemented by the Australian embassy in 
Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador in 2015-16 (http://goo.gl/OPxXE0). Indeed, foreign aid to developing countries 
often takes the form of public investment programs. See, for instance, USAID (https://goo.gl/Lkf8TS) or the 2014 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Central African Republic (http://goo.gl/cmbie3) to 
promote social cohesion, rebuild local infrastructure, and create short-term employment opportunities in 
communities that have seen homes and businesses destroyed by ongoing violence. These local investment 
programs are attractive to donors and governments alike, as they meet employment and poverty objectives, 
improve income and living standards in rural and urban areas, and strengthen the domestic construction industry. 
3 Theoretical models include, among others, a structural model in which time is allocated between criminal 
activities, the labour market, and nonmarket activities (Grogger, 1998). In his model, Grogger establishes that 
higher wages deter crime. Job search models, such as those constructed by Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003, 
2004), enabled crime and labour decisions to be endogenized, allowing for multiple equilibria to occur. This in 
turn opened the door to explanations of the high dispersion in crime rates across urban areas, for instance (see 
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996). 
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causal relationship between unemployment and crime, panel data studies (including, Papps and 
Winkelmann’s (2000) article on crime in New Zealand, and Entorf and Spengler’s (2000) 
article on crime in Germany) reported little effect. In contrast, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
(2001), drawing on state-level data for the U.S., found that the significant reduction in the (state 
aggregate) proportion of property crimes during the 1990s was due to a reduction in 
unemployment. This latter result is consistent with the findings of Machin and Meghir (2004) 
and Mocan and Rees (2005). Using an instrumental variable approach, Gould, Weinberg, and 
Mustard (2002) established a causal relationship between changes in the labour market 
prospects (especially wages) of young, unskilled men in U.S. counties from 1979 to 1997, and 
crime rates. They showed that “although crime rates are found to be significantly determined 
by both the wages and unemployment rates of less educated males, our results indicate that a 
sustained long-term decrease in crime rates will depend on whether the wages of less skilled 
men continue to improve” (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002). 
More recent publications have focused on individuals’ chances of engaging in illegal 
activities, depending on their employment status or prospects. This rectifies the tendency of 
earlier publications to focus mainly on unemployment, while overlooking other potential job 
opportunities in the labour market. This strand of the literature typically finds that the 
beneficiaries of improved economic conditions commit fewer crimes (see, for instance, 
Harbaugh, Mocan, and Visser, 2013, for evidence from an economic experiment). 
Another strand of the literature relevant to the current analysis seeks to disentangle the 
relationship – and the multiple forces that might be at work – between economic development 
(broadly defined) and illegal behavior. Here, the centrally planned economic measure I focus 
on was designed to promote a type of investment that would stimulate short-term economic 
activity (i.e., through job creation) while also strengthening the financing of municipalities. 
In this context, improved employment opportunities would appear to be a critical issue for 
local development, at least as far as small and medium-sized municipalities are concerned. 
However, the objectives of the FEIL also included the enhancement of the overall economic 
standing of municipalities, by boosting local economic growth and even reducing poverty and 
income inequality. Indeed, Kelly (2000) showed that, for urban counties in the U.S., that while 
inequality has no effect on property crime, it does have a strong and robust impact on violent 
crime. It seems to follow, therefore, that inequality may be associated with a lack of social 
capital and upward mobility, and with social disorganization, all of which may lead to higher 
crime rates. Yet, Kelly (2000) also showed that, while poverty has a significant effect on 
property crime, it has little effect on violent crime. 
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The FEIL specifically targeted municipal infrastructure improvement projects that 
presented socially useful and productive goals. A detailed review of the local projects that 
gained approval shows that many were designed to improve the municipalities’ social capital. 
Indeed, it is widely accepted that social capital (broadly defined) affects crime (see, for 
instance, Buonanno, Montolio, and Vanin, 2009), with various theories, developed by 
sociologists and criminologists, averring that social capital has a negative effect on crime. 
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (2001) claim that the social disorganization, anomie, and 
strain theories all predict that civic engagement and social trust (that is, social capital) should 
reduce crime, because they increase formal and informal social control, strengthen the 
effectiveness of social norms, and provide resources for individual goal attainment. It is clear 
that the purpose of many of the local investment projects proposed under the FEIL was to 
improve local conditions. Thus, the empirical strategy adopted herein and the Catalan Police 
Department’s detailed database should help in determining the factors that impacted the change 
in local crime rates. 
 
3. Institutional Setting: The 2008-09 FEIL  
 
As a result of the crisis ushered in in early September 2008, the unemployment rate in Spain 
rose from a record low of 7.95 percent in the second quarter of 2007 to 11.34 percent in 2008. 
In 2009, it shot up to 18.01 percent, twice the average unemployment rate of the Eurozone 
countries. This increase in unemployment was especially marked in the construction sector, a 
phenomenon that would come to be known as the “bursting of the housing bubble” (in which 
Spain had lived since the early 2000s). 
Against this backdrop, the Spanish Central Government – led by Socialist Prime Minister 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero – created a public fund to finance local investment projects, the 
chief purpose of which was to create jobs (or reduce unemployment) at the local (municipal) 
level. The fund, formally called Fondo Estatal de Inversión Local (FEIL), was popularly 
known as Plan E or Plan Zapatero. Using this public investment fund – established on 
November 28, 2008 under Royal Decree-Law 9/2008 – the Spanish government approved a 
series of loans worth €8 billion, an initiative that represented 0.76 percent of GDP in 2009. The 
objective of the FEIL was to maintain and create jobs (avoid job destruction), especially in the 
construction industry, and to shore up those businesses (especially SMEs) that were tied to the 
construction industry. 
Between December 10, 2008 and January 24, 2009, a total of 8,108 Spanish municipalities 
(99.8 percent) electronically proposed 30,903 projects, of which 30,698 were approved (99.6 
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percent). Contingent upon the project’s approval, to ensure that funds were distributed equally 
across the municipalities, the investment per municipality was allocated in accordance with its 
population, with approximately €177 being made available per inhabitant. The maximum 
amount allocated to each project could not exceed €5 million, and most public works had to be 
undertaken in 2009.4 Almost 80 percent of the investment was dedicated to rehabilitation 
projects and improving public spaces, facilities, basic services and cultural infrastructure, 
schools, and sports arenas. Municipalities were paid 70 percent of the project costs at the outset, 
and 30 percent upon its (certified) completion. 
Various features of the FEIL itself, and the way it was administered, make it an ideal 
example of a source of exogenous variation in local unemployment rates. Analyzing the FEIL’s 
potential impact on local crime is equally edifying. First, the fund was a totally unanticipated 
shock for local public finances. Indeed, the Royal Decree-Law was issued at the end of 
November5 (when all local public budgets for the next fiscal year had already been drawn up 
and many of them approved), and it clearly established that the funding would be dedicated to 
local public investment not included within the 2009 budget.6 As such, this represented an 
unanticipated increase in local public budgets. 
Second, the FEIL was pushed through urgently, meaning that, for the Central Government, 
timing was crucial if the policy was to have an immediate impact on the labour market. This 
meant that for project proposals to be funded they had to include public works that could be 
implemented immediately (i.e., work tenders were to begin within a month of the publication 
of the FEIL funding-authorization resolution on the Ministry of Public Administration’s 
website). This aspect of the timing window is critical for the identification strategy employed 
herein, given that it defines when treatment started for a given municipality. As such, it is 
examined in more detail below. 
 
3.1 FEIL Application, Approval, and Public Procurement Rules in Spain 
 
In its eagerness to impact labour outcomes as quickly as possible, Spain’s Central Government 
took a number of drastic measures. First, it fast-tracked the approval and implementation of all 
                                                          
4 In principle, all public works were to be finished by the end of 2009, and the work completion certificate 
submitted to the Ministry by March 2010. The only information available is from a 2010 follow-up report, which 
states that in July 2010, 99.78 percent of municipalities had received the first payment (70 percent) and that 93.60 
percent of municipalities had already received the second payment. As a result, the projects were liquidated (see 
MPT, 2010). 
5 Although the Royal Decree-Law was issued on Friday, November 28, it was not published in Spain’s Official 
State Bulletin (BOE) until December 2, 2008. 
6 In fact, as part of the application process, the municipalities were required to certify that the investment had not 
previously been factored into the 2009 budget. 
8 
 
public works projects proposed by accelerating the tender and award process. Second, it 
conducted its operations almost entirely online. Third, its territorial delegations (usually one 
per province) had to verify that projects met the requirements established in the Royal Decree-
Law. Once this verification was complete, the territorial delegations sent an electronic 
notification to the Secretary of State for Regional Cooperation, who then issued the resolution 
authorizing the project’s financing. Finally, the Secretary of State for Regional Cooperation 
published the resolution on the Ministry of Public Administration’s website. In this way, the 
Central Government could decentralize and accelerate the process without putting the Secretary 
of State for Regional Cooperation under unreasonable pressure. 
 
3.1.1 Submission and Approval of Project Applications 
 
The period for submitting project applications ran between December 10, 2008 and January 
24, 2009. As soon as an application was received, the Central Government’s territorial 
delegations had up to 10 business days to review it. Once reviewed, and once the respective 
delegation had informed the Secretary of State for Regional Cooperation that the project 
qualified for the FEIL, the Secretary of State for Regional Cooperation had up to 10 business 
days to issue the authorizing resolution and get it published on the Ministry’s website.  
The first resolution of approved projects was published on December 20, 2008. In 
principle, a project submitted on the last day of the submission period (January 24, 2009) 
should have been approved by February 20, 2009. However, some resolutions were published 
as late as March 24, 2009. In other words, there was a four-month window (from December 
2008 to March 2009) during which projects could be approved. 
 
3.1.2 Tender and Implementation Process 
 
Once the project had been approved, and as explicitly stated in the Royal Decree-Law, the 
tender procedure had to adhere strictly to public procurement rules, which in Spain vary 
according to the amount allocated to the project and its nature. The tendering of public works 
could be completed in accordance with any of the procedures under the law governing public 
sector contracts. That is, tenders could be open, restricted, negotiated with or without publicity, 
or processed as a smaller contract. 
The urgent introduction of the fund meant all projects were categorized as being for 
immediate implementation; as such, the tender procedure had to begin within a month of the 
publication of the FEIL funding-authorization resolution on the Ministry of Public 
9 
 
Administration’s website. The length of the tender process, though, varied depending on the 
amount allocated to the project (see Table 1).7 
 
Table 1. Summary of Public Procurement Procedures for Investment Projects in Spain 







Minor contract < €50,000 < 1 month < 1 month 
Negotiated with no publicity 
>€50,000 and 
<€200,000 
2–3 months 1–2 months 
Negotiated with publicity 
>€200,000 and 
<€1,000,000 
3–4 months 2–3 months 
Open or restricted procedure (not 
subject to EU harmonized regulation)  
>€1,000,000 and 
<€5,000,000 
3–4 months 2–3 months 
Open or restricted procedure (subject 
to EU harmonized regulation) 
>€5,000,000 5–6 months 3–4 months 
Source: Author’s calculations based on http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2011-17887 and 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/index_en.htm. 
 
Projects with amounts allocated of less than €50,000 were considered minor works 
contracts, and could be assigned directly to a contractor without any type of public competition. 
Indeed, the Royal Decree-Law established that in the case of such contracts, not only did the 
tender process have to take place within a month, but the project had to be awarded to a private 
firm. 
Public procurement procedures became more complicated for project amounts above 
€50,000. For example, public investment projects for amounts between €50,000 and €200,000 
were subject to the no-publicity procedure, and it was expected to take between one and two 
months for the project to be awarded. In the case of projects for amounts greater than €200,000 
                                                          
7 Given how fast the program was rolled out and the fact that nearly every proposal was approved, there are 
possible concerns regarding corrupt practices in the management of these funds. Although some cases of 
corruption were later discovered and investigated (see, for instance, https://goo.gl/pkjMyH), during the period 
under analysis there was no (general) perception of corruption regarding these funds and, perhaps more 
importantly, the cases identified were associated more closely with prevarication, that is, instances of a public 
servant dictating an arbitrary decision in an administrative matter knowing such a resolution to be unfair. In 
general, cases of corruption associated with public infrastructure in Spain have not involved the non-completion 
of the investment, but rather the awarding of public contracts to specific firms. These firms, in return, provided 
illegal funding to political parties in power (those awarding the projects). However, corruption would tend to bias 
our results towards finding no first-stage relationship between the FEIL and labour market outcomes (since the 
program’s funds would be lining the pockets of corrupt politicians instead of being dedicated to improving 
infrastructure), but this is not what the empirical results show. 
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and less than €5,000,000 (this upper limit being established by the Royal Decree-Law precisely 
to restrict tender procedures)8, three tender options were available: a procedure negotiated with 
publicity, an open procedure, and a restricted procedure. These last two options applied to cases 
not subject to EU harmonization regulation. For all three procedures, and taking into account 
that all three could be issued urgently, the expected duration was between two and three 
months. 
Timing is clearly critical for determining when these local investment projects were 
initiated and, consequently, when the potential impact on labour outcomes and crime rates may 
have occurred. Given the circumstances, it is reasonable to expect differences in the time frame 
dictated by the size and nature of the projects. Small projects were undoubtedly carried out 
within a shorter time frame than were their larger counterparts.9 
 
3.2 Defining the Treatment 
 
The identification strategy relies on the nature of the FEIL program because, as explained 
above, these funds emerged from nowhere and projects were undertaken and implemented as 
a matter of some urgency at the local level. Given the way funding was planned, organized, 
and managed during project submission and approval stages – and, as shown in Figure 1 (for 
projects submitted by the Catalan municipalities) – projects were approved on a daily basis. 
Moreover, resolutions listing projects granted approval throughout Spain were published 
almost daily. 
Importantly, the timing of the approval of local investment projects varied from month to 
month and by municipality. Recall, projects were approved from December 2008 through 
March 2009.10 However, as Figure 1 shows, only seven projects from four Catalan 
municipalities were approved in March 2009, whereas 211 projects from 30 Catalan 
municipalities (nine with a population above 500 inhabitants) were approved in December 
2008. Hence, in order to simplify the empirical exercise, I opt to omit these two approval dates 
                                                          
8 In order not to exceed this amount, local governments were not permitted to split the project into two or more 
projects. However, it was possible for municipalities to contribute their own funds. In all circumstances, the tender 
procedure of FEIL-funded projects had to adhere to the rules for projects for amounts below the €5,000,000 
threshold. 
9 For example, a project funded to the tune of €14,210 and entitled “Adapting Plots of Municipal Property to the 
Terms of Rule That Prevent Forest Fires” (which essentially involved clearing a municipal plot in Bescanó, 
Girona, of weeds) had a shorter implementation time and a less substantial impact on labour outcomes than the a 
project funded to the tune of €2,999,927 and entitled “Works of Reform and Extension of the Francesc Calvet 
Sports Center” in Sant Joan Despí (Barcelona). 
10 A final (extraordinary) FEIL approval was granted in December 2009. In the case of the Catalan municipalities, 
this only affected projects proposed by the city of Barcelona, which, as discussed in this section, is excluded from 
the empirical analysis. 
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from the rest of the analysis.11 Consequently, I define the treatment status by the month in which 
a municipality’s projects were approved; that is, in January 2009 or February 2009. 
 
Figure 1. Daily and Monthly Approval of Projects  
by the Ministry of Public Administration 
  
        Note: Projects submitted by Catalan municipalities. 
 
Before elaborating further on the treatment definition, I briefly present the figures for the 
FEIL in Catalonia. In the 948 Catalan municipalities (corresponding to 11.7 percent of the 
Spanish total), where the average project amount was €324,281.97,12 3,930 projects were 
approved (corresponding to 12.8 percent of the Spanish total) to the tune of €1.276 billion (16.0 
percent). The amount injected into the Catalan municipalities was equivalent to 0.64 percent 
of total regional GDP. 
Interestingly, for the research strategy, of the 948 Catalan municipalities, 872 (92.3 
percent) had projects approved within a single month, while the remaining 76 had projects 
approved over a period of several months. I omitted these 76 municipalities from the analysis, 
since their populations are, on average, higher, and they submitted an average of 25.3 projects 
each (ranging from a low of two projects to a high of 302, in the case of the city of Barcelona). 
For these municipalities, I do not have a clearly defined temporal treatment definition. 
In addition to eliminating these 76 municipalities, I further restricted the sample to 
municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants. There are several reasons for proceeding in this 
                                                          
11 From the sample of municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants and with all their project proposals approved 
in one month, only nine had all their projects approved in December 2008. In Appendix D, I present, as a 
robustness exercise, the main results of the paper when December 2008 is also included as an approval date. 
12 From a regional perspective – and consistent with the government’s criterion of distributing FEIL funds in 
accordance with the municipalities’ populations – Catalonia was the second largest recipient of total FEIL funding, 
behind Andalucía (which represents 9.5 percent of all the Spanish municipalities and whose share of the funding 
corresponded to 17.8 percent). The Madrid region occupied third place, its 179 municipalities (2.2 percent of the 
total) receiving 13.5 percent of the FEIL funds. It received an average of €867,292.96 per project, by far the 
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manner. Small municipalities in Catalonia, and in Spain as a whole, have long faced an 
organizational problem: they lack an auditor/treasurer (secretario-interventor) on their 
municipal councils. This means that there is often no one authorized to validate the agreements 
approved by the council.13 The most common solution is for these municipalities to share an 
auditor who periodically rotates between the councils. This, however, affects a municipality’s 
ability to apply and manage such funds as the FEIL. Moreover, procurement procedures for 
these small municipalities are not especially strict and are readily modified. In fact, in the FEIL 
Royal-Decree Law, explicit mention was made of this concern, to the effect that the Ministry 
of Public Administration could, in exceptional cases, authorize direct implementation of public 
works in municipalities with fewer than 200 inhabitants. The special nature of these 
municipalities, and the uncertainty with respect to their tender procedures and eventual project 
implementation, result in their being excluded from this study. This means the final sample is 
largely homogeneous in terms of the type of municipality included, thus we are able to avoid 
any potential distortions attributable to the inclusion of very small or very large municipalities. 
The remaining 539 municipalities submitted, on average, 3.4 project proposals, with a low 
of 1 and a high of 37, with population figures ranging from 501 to 107,770 inhabitants.14 
However, they do not all comprise the final sample. As explained above, not only does the 
month in which approval was granted matter, but we also take into consideration the duration 
of the tender procedures and project implementation. Based on the information in Table 1, I 
computed a tender and award period for each project approved by the Ministry of Public 
Administration, according to the amount of funding granted. For projects below €50,000, I 
assume a tender and award period of one month following the month in which the project was 
approved. For projects for amounts between €50,000 and €200,000, I assume a two-month 
                                                          
13 This situation is due to the fact that these municipalities cannot afford to hire a secretario-interventor (i.e., a 
high-ranking civil servant who is appointed after passing a highly competitive nationwide examination) or because 
not all auditors/treasurers want to live in municipalities with fewer than 500 inhabitants. 
14 As the descriptive statistics show, the municipalities submitted, on average, two projects to the Ministry, many 
of which were approved the same day. However, there were instances in which municipalities had various projects 
approved on several different days within the same month. For example, La Garriga, a municipality in the province 
of Barcelona with 15,000 inhabitants, submitted nine projects: one was approved on February 2, 2009; six were 
approved on February 11, 2009; and two were approved on February 12, 2009. Similarly, Sant Feliu de Llobregat, 
a municipality in the province of Barcelona with 43,000 inhabitants, had five projects approved on three different 
dates: February 3, 2009; February 10, 2009; and February 11, 2009. Vila-seca, a municipality in the province of 




period, while for projects for amounts above €200,000, I assume a three-month period before 
project implementation.15 
I further restrict the sample, therefore, to include municipalities submitting projects that 
were approved within a similar period of tender duration. Although nearly 50 percent of the 
539 municipalities presented a single project (and up to 70 percent three projects which, in 
general, are quite similar in terms of tender duration), I use a restricted sample of 348 
municipalities on which to perform the main estimates. Table 2 presents the summary statistics 
by approval status. Appendix D, however, also presents the full set of results when using all 
three approval statuses (that is, including also projects approved in December 2008) and 
restricting the sample to municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants. 
 
Table 2. Municipal Summary Statistics by Approval Status 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
Approval = 2009m1      
Population 4,581.12 8,313.17 510 45,994 91 
Number of projects 2 2 1 10 91 
Total amount 751,263.90 1,303,149.00 86,051.91 7,907,482 91 
Amount per project 390,604.80 576,053.80 36,459.67 4,574,085 91 
Tender period 2.5 0.5 1 3 91 
Approval = 2009m2      
Population 2,775.04 4,216.49 501 33,761 257 
Number of projects 2 1 1 9 257 
Total amount 438,132.50 565,566.60 68,816.99 3,870,910 257 
Amount per project 294,645.70 394,378.70 23,207.63 3,870,910 257 
Tender period 2.3 0.6 1 3 257 
 
The identification strategy relies on two facts. First, as I demonstrate below, a different 
month for Ministry approval is a random factor, or at least one that is independent of the main 
variables of interest. Second, I take advantage of public procurement rules to assign a tender 
and award period for each project, depending on the amount assigned to it. This allows me to 
accurately match the succession of events between project approval, tender, implementation, 
and the project’s impact on unemployment and crime. 
Thus, variation in the FEIL dummy (treatment) arises from (1) the fact that applications 
were approved at different times for different municipalities and that (2) different sized projects 
took different amounts of time to go from application approval to implementation. For 
example, two municipalities, each with only one 100,000€ project, could have their FEIL 
                                                          
15 Defining the tender and award periods for projects for amounts between €50,000 and €200,000 as 1.5 months 
and for projects for amounts above €200,000 as 2.5 months does not significantly change the results obtained and 
presented in the rest of the paper. 
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dummy activated at different times by virtue of their having their proposals approved in 
different months (January 2009 vs. February 2009). Similarly, two municipalities that had 
projects approved in the same month could have their FEIL dummies activated at different 
times if these projects were of different sizes (so the tender periods would be different). For 
example, the municipality of Arenys de Munt (in the province of Barcelona) obtained only one 
project approved in February 2009 for an overall amount of 1,371,739€. Given this project 
amount the type of public procurement procedure expected was between 2-3 months under the 
urgent procedure (see Table 1) so its treatment status is activated in May 2009. 
Note that one positive aspect of the narrow time window used to identify FEIL’s impact 
on unemployment and crime rates is that the timing of the approval, tender, and implementation 
phases of each municipality’s FEIL projects is very unlikely to have coincided with another 
simultaneous shock that might have influenced the outcome variables and, so, invalidated the 
results. Moreover, the study does not suffer the potential drawback of the time distance between 
the announcement (approval) of a project and its implementation, as was the case in Freedman 
and Owens (2016) who have to rely on potential purchasing power increases of potential 




4.1 Labour Market Data 
 
I use monthly employment and unemployment figures from the Spanish Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security.17 At the municipal level, employment data only take into 
account registered workers in the existing regimes; they do not reveal the particular industry 
or personal attributes of those individuals. By contrast, registered unemployment data at the 
municipal level reveal considerably more details; thus, I have information about the industry, 
gender, and age of registered unemployed individuals. These details are useful for ascertaining 
who, if anyone, benefited from the FEIL. They are also useful for determining the potential 
dynamics at play if crime rates should also be found to have been affected.18 
                                                          
16 It is very unlikely that firms anticipated the announcement of the FEIL program, since they did not have extra 
personnel in place ahead of time to undertake the potential projects being designed and submitted by local 
governments: first, because the Royal Decree-Law was issued quickly (and unpredictably) and using emergency 
procedures, and, second, because the projects could not have been previously budgeted for. This means that neither 
firms nor workers could have anticipated them by looking at the 2009 municipal budget. 
17 I use officially registered unemployed workers at the public employment office (Servicio Público de Empleo 
Estatal) as a job seekers. 
18 It is well known that registered unemployment figures are lower than those obtained from the Spanish Labour 
Force Survey (EPA). Registered unemployment is a recount of the unemployed who apply for benefits at regional 
public employment offices. It does not, for instance, include students looking for a job, or people who have given 
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Given the FEIL’s objectives, the fund’s impact should, in principle, be greater on 
construction workers (or unemployed construction workers) due to the nature of the public 
works financed by the fund and the Royal Decree-Law’s explicit reference to the construction 
industry and related industries. 
The time span for the estimations runs from January 2007 through December 2009. The 
main reason for this cutoff is that, by the end of 2009, the Spanish Central Government had set 
up a second fund. This €5 billion fund, known as FEES (Fondo Estatal para el Empleo y la 
Sostenibilidad Local, that is, the State Fund for Employment and Local Sustainability), was 
established on October 26, 2009 by Royal Decree-Law 13/2009. Under the FEES, potential 
projects seeking funding had to be submitted between November 2009 and January 2010. 
Funding for these municipal projects was approved between January 2010 and May 2010. For 
this reason, I use year-end 2009 as the cutoff point for this study to prevent the estimates from 
capturing any possible impact from this second fund. 
 
Figure 2. Labour Market Outcomes and the FEIL Approval Period 
 
                                                          
up looking for work through the national employment system and who seek employment on their own. Despite 
this, Figure F.1 in Appendix F shows that quarterly, provincial-level unemployment data from both sources 
present the same trends. Moreover, an individual must be registered for unemployment benefit in order to be 
entitled to receive it. In late 2008 and early 2009, when the economic crisis was in its early stages and 
unemployment benefit started being drawn, it is reasonable to assume that workers who lost their jobs applied for 
this benefit (by registering at the public employment offices). For this reason, it can also be assumed that registered 
unemployment statistics were more reliable during that period that they were during other periods when there may 
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Figure 2 presents aggregate data for both employment and unemployment in the Catalan 
municipalities, together with the (full) time window during which FEIL projects were 
approved. Starting in mid-2008, both data series show consistent change as the crisis breaks 
out and deepens, with a sharp acceleration in unemployment rates (a steep decline in 
employment rates). Interestingly, during the period when the FEIL projects were being 
approved, employment rates continued to decrease as unemployment rates increased. However, 
immediately following the program approval period (i.e., the period when the projects would 
have been implemented), both data series clearly underwent substantial changes. The objective 
here is to determine whether that change is a meaningful result of the FEIL program. If it is, 
the goal is then to determine whether this change in labour outcomes also affected crime rates 
at the local level. 
With respect to labour outcomes, the Ministerio de Política Territorial (Ministry of 
Territorial Policy, 2010) reported that FEIL projects provided employment for a total of 
426,195 people in Spain, of whom 59,693 (14.0 percent) were employed in Catalonia. In 2009, 
this figure accounted for approximately 12 percent of the overall unemployed population in 
that region, which represents quite a remarkable impact. 
Figure 3 presents further details on the labour outcomes, this time by selected types of 
unemployment and approval status.19 Note that all types of unemployment (by industry, gender, 
education, and age) increased after mid-2008, particularly the registered rate in the construction 
industry.20 Figures 2 and 3 both show that unemployment rates increased more slowly (even 
decreasing temporarily). This suggests that the FEIL program may have buffered employment 
(and reduced registered unemployment) against the sharp economic downturn that began in 
mid-2008. Against this backdrop, the empirical strategy assesses whether this relationship is 
statistically robust and can be considered causal.21 
 
  
                                                          
19 Figure 3 reports unemployment rates for the gender (male), sectoral (construction), education (low) and age 
(young) categories that I consider most relevant for the discussion below. 
20 In the case of unemployment by age, I construct three categories: young (less than 25 years old); middle-aged 
(25-40 years old) and mature (more than 40 years old). 
21 Figures 2 to 5 should be seen as descriptive, while the results embodied in Tables 5 to 8 (and those in the various 
appendices) can be considered as being more informative and accurate regarding the effect analyzed. The fact that 
the treatment depends on both the month in which approval was granted and the expected procurement period 
(which in turn depends on the project amount) does not make it especially visible when we would expect to find 
a differential impact on treated municipalities with respect to control municipalities. 
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4.2 Crime Data 
 
I use a non-public dataset containing all the crimes recorded by the Mossos d’Esquadra (the 
autonomous police agency in Catalonia), responsible for crime prevention and specialized 
crime investigation in the Catalan region. This dataset contains reports filed by both citizens 
and the Mossos d’Esquadra, as well as by local police forces, who are responsible primarily 
for urban traffic and upholding municipal laws and ordinances. 
The dataset records the time the crime took place (if known), the location of the crime, and 
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2009.22 Illegal activities are roughly classified in accordance with the 190 articles making up 
the Spanish penal code. However, to reduce the number of categories without causing an 
aggregation bias that might undermine the estimates (Cherry and List, 2002), I combined some 
of these articles, taking care not to aggregate crimes with different offender motivations. I 
ended up with three main categories: property crimes (with a clear economic return), crimes 
against the person, and other types of crime. 
For property crimes (84 percent of all crimes recorded in Catalonia during the period 
2007–09), I calculated the number of “Thefts”, “Robberies”, “Car thefts”, and “Damage to 
property”. Thefts, the misappropriation of others’ belongings without resorting to any type of 
violence, are by and large the most common type of crime recorded, representing 
approximately 43.7 percent of all recorded felonies. Robberies (14.3 percent of the total) entail 
some sort of violent behavior by offenders, and could therefore be classified more accurately 
as a mix between property crimes and crimes against the person, although the original 
definition of a robbery is to take property unlawfully. 
The main crimes involving interpersonal violence, here classified as crimes against the 
person (11 percent of all crimes recorded in Catalonia in the period 2007–09), include 
“Murders” (0.1 percent); “Injuries” (3.8 percent); “Gender violence” (3 percent); “Sexual 
assaults” (0.4 percent); and “Threats” (3.7 percent). A final aggregate category of other crimes 
(5 percent of all crimes recorded in Catalonia in the period 2007–09) include “Drug” 
consumption or trafficking (0.6 percent), and crimes against “Road safety” (4.4 percent). 
Figures 4 and 5 present graphical evidence regarding the trends taken by each type of 
criminal behavior and how these change according to municipality type. The general upward 
trend in recorded crime is clear for nearly all crime types (clearly, murder figures are more 
random than the other crime types, given that they are rare in Catalonia). Therefore, during the 
crisis there was a perception – perhaps fueled by the media – that crimes with a clear economic 
return increased. For instance, the number of thefts of copper wire and machinery in rural areas 
rose sharply, as did thefts targeting businesses located outside town centers. There was also a 
perception that robberies and thefts increased at private properties in remote areas or in small 
                                                          
22 The use of monthly data is of considerable advantage here. First, because criminal behavior varies greatly 
depending on when it takes place, as opposed to where it takes place. Secondly, as noted by Felson and Poulsen 
(2003), monthly crime cycles are well-known periodicities among criminologists (see, for example, Harries, 
1980). As such, they make it possible to analyze how quickly delinquency responds to changes in the environment, 
changes that usually even out in yearly data. 
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municipalities. Consequently, the overall spike in thefts and robberies could have had an 
important impact on the economy.23 
 
 
Figure 4. Trends in Local Crime Rates 
  
  
Note: Crime series data have been smoothed using a uniformly weighted moving average of the crime variable using four 
lagged terms, and including the current observation in the filter. Crime variables are expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. 
 
The data for the period under study seem to confirm this upward trend in crime rates in 
Catalonia. Note that, again, there appears to be no differential trend for the municipalities with 
respect to their treatment status, which is good news for our identification strategy. In line with 
the unemployment figures, the crime data present a downward trend some months after 
termination of the period of approval for FEIL projects. This trend, however, is reversed around 
mid-2009. In this respect, when looking at disaggregated figures for the various crime 
categories, each crime type presents turning points at different dates (compare, for instance, 
Thefts and Robberies in Figure 4). However, when the various types of crime are analyzed in 
aggregate terms, these differences even out. 
To facilitate the presentation of the results, I only report the outcomes obtained for property 
crimes, that is, the crimes which, in principle, can be expected to be most affected by changes 
in economic outlook (in terms, that is, of increased labour opportunities) as a result of the FEIL 
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program. The full set of results for crimes against the person and other types of crimes is 
presented, however, in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 5. Crime Rates and Approval Status 
  
 
Note: see Figure 4.  
 
5. Identification Strategy and Econometric Specifications 
 
The empirical specification outlined below seeks to reveal a causal relationship between the 
unemployment (as the key variable of local development) and crime rates, where the FEIL 
program acts as an exogenous shock to labour outcomes and, hence, to crime. The structural 
equation can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡  ,   (1) 
 
which, of course, is liable to suffer from all the well-documented problems that make OLS 
estimates inadequate: ranging from measurement errors (or omitted variables affecting both 
variables of interest) to reverse-causality problems. In this equation, i and t index municipalities 
and months, respectively. Unemploymentit is our outcome of interest: unemployment rates (by 
industry, gender, education level, and age). In this specification, the first-stage regressions 



































𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝐹𝐸𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ,   (2) 
 
where FEILit indicates a municipality receiving funds and implementing project investment at 
time t.24 As discussed in Section 3, the main variable of interest takes into account not only the 
month of project approval, but also the tender period by project type (size). Recall, the sample 
is restricted to those municipalities that obtained project approvals in only one of the two-
month windows for project selection, and for projects of the same size. As a result, identifying 
our parameter of interest, δ, only requires that the timing of approvals should be uncorrelated 
with time-varying, unobserved factors that themselves generate outcomes of interest. Were the 
sample to include municipalities that were not treated under the FEIL program, the identifying 
assumption would be more restrictive and require both when and if a municipality receives the 
public investment to be uncorrelated with trends in these unobserved factors that could also 
generate outcomes of interest. 
A key aspect of the present specification is the timing of events. On the one hand (as 
discussed in Section 3.2), I deal with tender procedures that vary according to the size of the 
project, as defined by our main variable of interest, FEILit. However, there might be some 
uncertainty as to when the projects were actually implemented, or at least when they began to 
have some impact on labour outcomes and crime rates. For example, projects may present 
different time profiles in relation to their hiring of personnel, i.e., a project might be more 
labour intensive at a specific stage of its implementation. To address this issue, I use FEILit 
variable lags (post-treatment) to account for the varying impact of a project with time. As 
explained, the number of lags used is conditioned by the fact that, in late 2009, a second call 
for projects was announced: the FEES fund.25 Thus, a five-month forward period, coupled with 
a three-month tender period (for projects for amounts above €200,000), for a FEIL project 
approved in February 2009 provides for an estimated impact up to October 2009. 
For this strategy to be successful, several conditions must be met. First, the FEIL variable 
cannot be correlated with the error term of the structural equation; that is, it must be 
uncorrelated with other (omitted) variables that might also affect crime rates. If there is little 
doubt that the instrument (the FEIL fund) affects the endogenous variable, given that it was 
one of the legal requirements of the program, what else might the FEIL program have affected 
in those municipalities and with such deterministic timing? Or, more generally, what other 
potentially invalidating factors might have changed during that period in those specific 
                                                          
24 Given how the FEILit indicator is constructed, equation (2) can be easily understood as a diff-in-diff setup. 
25 In this sense, workers and firms with prior FEIL experience could anticipate the impact of the new FEES funds 
and, hence, this could introduce some noise into the estimates. 
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municipalities (in response to the local public investment plan) and in such a way that they 
might also have had a significant impact on crime? 
It is not easy to identify one socioeconomic factor that would change so markedly at the 
municipal level and on a monthly basis. Two factors represent potential threats to the 
identification strategy: population dynamics and the outcomes of the projects themselves. In 
the case of the first of these factors, it is quite unlikely for people to change residence simply 
because the FEIL program has been approved and implemented, especially in such a short 
period of time. Indeed, construction workers – those most likely to be hired under the FEIL – 
and the population in general did not consult on a frequent basis the Spanish government’s 
website (or, for that matter, the website of the Ministry responsible for managing the fund) to 
find out when projects were approved. Nor did they know what tender procedures would be 
adopted so that they could estimate when a project would be implemented in the municipality. 
Although there was news coverage of the program’s launch,26 it is not plausible to assume that 
individuals would have been aware of the projects submitted by each municipality, when the 
projects were approved, or how tender procedures worked. Consequently, we cannot assume 
that these individuals would have chosen to move in order to increase their chances of being 
hired to work on a project. Moreover, any possible effect induced by population inflows of 
unofficially registered individuals (“call-effect”) in the municipality can be ruled out, given 
that they could not have been registered as unemployed (i.e. individuals without a work permit). 
Hence, the municipality could not justify hiring them in the liquidation of the FEIL projects 
before the Ministry of Public Administration (a legal requirement of the call). 
Second, it could be argued that the projects themselves may also have reduced crime rates 
once completed. This may have been the case if we assume that the local development projects 
were designed to improve municipal infrastructure provision (given they had socially useful 
and productive goals), and note, as discussed above in the literature review, that there is 
evidence linking a better “local environment” (broadly defined) and lower crime rates (see, 
among others, Keizer et al., 2008, and references therein). Yet, while such a connection is 
possible, it would be some time before we could expect a municipality’s “social capital” to 
react to the specific implementation of a FEIL project. Moreover, an impact on the “social 
capital” would be very difficult to detect in the (short-run) time profile proposed for the 
estimations. For example, the construction of a sports center would undoubtedly improve a 
                                                          
26 News coverage of the FEIL plan included, among others, articles published on 27 November 2008 




municipality’s amenities and enhance social conditions with an expected positive (reduction) 
impact on crime rates once fully operative; however, some time would have to elapse before 
this impact could be observed. In contrast, the impact of this project on labour outcomes can 
be expected to be observed from the onset of the construction of the local infrastructure (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3. FEIL Projects by Typology 
Category # % 
Rehabilitation and improvement of public spaces 1,438 36.59 
Basic services facilities and infrastructure 773 19.67 
Cultural, educational or sports buildings and facilities 760 19.34 
Social, health and funeral buildings and facilities 263 6.69 
Promoting mobility and road safety 263 6.69 
Removal of architectural barriers 134 3.41 
Energy savings and efficiency 113 2.88 
Conservation of historic and municipal heritage 91 2.32 
Environmental protection 42 1.07 
Fire prevention 29 0.74 
Industrial promotion 14 0.36 
Promotion of tourism 10 0.25 
TOTAL 3,930 100 
Notes: Numbers and percentages calculated using the original full list of projects approved in Catalonia. For instance, a text 
search of the names of the projects reveals that only 17 projects (0.4%), corresponding to 14 municipalities, include the word 
“ILU”, used to identify projects to install additional city lighting. Only 10 of these 14 municipalities are included in the final 




6.1 First-Stage Results: The Impact of FEIL on Unemployment 
 
I begin by examining the FEIL variable in greater detail, given that it is understood to be a 
source of exogenous variation in time and by municipality that should enable the identification 
of causal effects across the main variables of interest: namely, unemployment and crime rates. 
Table 4 reports the balancing t-tests of the municipal characteristics according to the month of 
project approval. These results are completed with the evidence provided in Appendix A, which 
reports further evidence on the determinants of the probability of a project being approved in a 
specific month. Both pieces of evidence suggest that the month of approval was random or, at 
least, that the Central Government did not take into account any relevant municipal 
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characteristics, especially related to labour outcomes and crime rates, in the approval 
procedure.27 
 
Table 4. T-tests for Balancing Characteristics on Treatment Status 
VARIABLES 2009m1 2009m2 t-test 
Average project characteristics    
Amount per project 387,228,9 292,338.7 1.73* 
 (576,832) (393,723.8) [0.083] 
Number of projects 1.69 1.77 -0.45 
 (1.51) (1.48) [0.652] 
Labour market conditions    
Employment rate 0.376 0.373 0.09 
 (0.185) (0.218) [0.925] 
Unemployment rate 0.0346 0.0346 -0.024 
 (0.013) (0.012) [0.980] 
Male unemployment rate 0.0155 0.0161 -0.797 
 (0.006) (0.005) [0.425] 
Female unemployment rate 0.0190 0.0185 0.581 
 (0.007) (0.007) [0.561] 
Construction unemp. rate 0.0045 0.0048 -0.944 
 (0.002) (0.03) [0.345] 
Industry unemp. rate 0.008 0.009 -0.678 
 (0.005) (0.006) [0.497] 
Services unemp. rate 0.019 0.018 0.783 
 (0.008) (0.007) [0.461] 
Agriculture unemp. rate 0.001 0.001 0.972 
 (0.001) (0.001) [0.331] 
Low education unemp. rate 0.005 0.006 -0.813 
 (0.003) (0.003) [0.416] 
High education unemp. rate 0.028 0.028 0.244 
 (0.011) (0.010) [0.807] 
Young unemp. rate 0.003 0.003 -0.504 
 (0.001) (0.001) [0.614] 
Middle age unemp. rate 0.014 0.013 0.684 
 (0.006) (0.005) [0.493] 
Mature age unemp. rate 0.017 0.017 -0.455 
 (0.007) (0.007) [0.649] 
Crime rates    
Car thefts 0.253 0.315 -0.604 
 (0.276) (0.948) [0.546] 
Thefts 0.539 0.593 -0.610 
 (0.469) (0.786) [0.541] 
Robberies 0.587 0.571 0.261 
 (0.471) (0.516) [0.794] 
Damage to property 0.362 0.308 1.455 
 (0.267) (0.321) [0.146] 
Murders 0.003 0.003 -0.169 
 (0.014) (0.017) [0.844] 
Injuries 0.108 0.099 0.617 
                                                          
27 Even though I am unable to observe the application process, the application time does not appear to be cause 
for any real concern. Apart from the very tight schedule (December 10, 2008 to January 24, 2009), Table 4 and 
Table A1 can also be seen as providing hints to the non-difference between municipalities with regard to the 
application process itself, especially if approval of projects followed a first-in-first-out rule. Although it is 
impossible to know how the application process was conducted exactly, it is plausible that given the huge number 
of projects the Spanish Ministry had to evaluate and the speed the government wanted to impose (in its efforts to 
confront the worst of the crisis) the approval of projects did, broadly speaking, adhere to such a scheme. Indeed, 
Tables 4 and A1 do not present significant differences across municipalities. 
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 (0.100) (0.124) [0.537] 
Gender violence 0.095 0.084 1.019 
 (0.095) (0.084) [0.308] 
Sexual offenses 0.012 0.011 0.298 
 (0.023) (0.025) [0.765] 
Threats 0.151 0.136 0.983 
 (0.116) (0.127) [0.326] 
Drugs 0.010 0.013 -0.658 
 (0.025) (0.042) [0.510] 
Road safety 0.258 0.265 -0.141 
 (0.292) (0.386) [0.887] 
Census data    
2001 Degradation rate 0.150 0.135 0.048 
 (0.153) (0.132) [0.373] 
2001 Old population rate 0.210 0.218 -1.070 
 (0.067) (0.058) [0.284] 
2001 Young population rate 0.196 0.192 0.475 
 (0.067) (0.001) [0.634] 
2001 Illiteracy rate 0.008 0.008 -0.063 
 (0.001) (0.001) [0.949] 
2001 Employment rate 0.443 0.436 1.146 
 (0.048) (0.046) [0.252] 
2001 Unemployment rate 0.033 0.032 0.291 
 (0.016) (0.013) [0.771] 
Budget data    
Deficit per capita -12.24 -8.55 -0.091 
 (217.79) (360.57) [0.926] 
Public investment (%) 0.304 0.311 -0.358 
 (0.155) (0.168) [0.720] 
Security expenditures (%) 0.075 0.073 0.248 
 (0.073) (0.068) [0.804] 
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets; p-values in square brackets. T-test computed for the sample of 348 municipalities with 
more than 500 inhabitants, all projects having been approved in one month and all projects being of the same size. For this 
subsample, 91 municipalities had projects approved in January 2009 and 257 municipalities had projects approved in February 
2009. All variables are measured in year 2008 except average project variables and census variables which are measured in 
2001. The results are robust when using the sample of 539 municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants and all the projects 
approved in one month (where 142 municipalities had projects approved in January 2009 and 397 municipalities had projects 
approved in February 2009). 
 
Having shown that the FEIL variable is uncorrelated with the labour outcomes and crime 
rates of the affected municipalities and, hence, that it is indeed exogenous, I next present the 






Table 5. First-Stage Estimates: Impact of FEIL Projects on Unemployment 


























             
             
FEILt0 -0.1692*** -0.1977*** -0.1056*** -0.2355*** -0.1305*** -0.0693 -0.0883 -0.1454*** -0.1532*** -0.1150** -0.1982*** -0.1081*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0438) (0.0369) (0.0599) (0.0388) (0.0439) (0.0538) (0.0505) (0.0369) (0.0554) (0.0526) (0.0377) 
FEILt-1 -0.1574*** -0.1881*** -0.0938** -0.2227*** -0.1313*** -0.0546 -0.0714 -0.1454*** -0.1392*** -0.0902 -0.1762*** -0.1161*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0443) (0.0365) (0.0589) (0.0405) (0.0455) (0.0568) (0.0511) (0.0365) (0.0567) (0.0543) (0.0405) 
FEILt-2 -0.1649*** -0.2134*** -0.0808** -0.2440*** -0.1178*** -0.0589 -0.0262 -0.1698*** -0.1400*** -0.1035* -0.1895*** -0.1384*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0435) (0.0353) (0.0569) (0.0391) (0.0445) (0.0630) (0.0479) (0.0365) (0.0541) (0.0541) (0.0405) 
FEILt-3 -0.1640*** -0.2088*** -0.0841** -0.2570*** -0.1207*** -0.0437 0.0223 -0.1323*** -0.1514*** -0.1257** -0.2037*** -0.1311*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0425) (0.0374) (0.0550) (0.0400) (0.0475) (0.0702) (0.0488) (0.0383) (0.0537) (0.0505) (0.0427) 
FEILt-4 -0.1645*** -0.1975*** -0.0970** -0.2583*** -0.1212*** -0.0266 0.0346 -0.1529*** -0.1452*** -0.0938 -0.2268*** -0.1165** 
 (0.0408) (0.0456) (0.0413) (0.0557) (0.0431) (0.0539) (0.0585) (0.0546) (0.0426) (0.0589) (0.0499) (0.0467) 
FEILt-5 -0.1547*** -0.1811*** -0.0963** -0.2463*** -0.1120*** -0.0465 0.1297 -0.1316** -0.1406*** -0.0647 -0.1879*** -0.1162** 
 (0.0415) (0.0485) (0.0408) (0.0575) (0.0423) (0.0549) (0.0951) (0.0636) (0.0449) (0.0607) (0.0508) (0.0500) 
             
Municip. FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month_year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 137.5*** 68.52*** 179.1*** 62.0*** 131.0*** 30.9*** 28.5*** 80.9*** 143.6*** 35,8*** 95.8*** 162.3*** 
# Obs. 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 
# Municip. 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 
Notes: Standardized variables. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants and all approved projects being of the same size. *** p<0.01, ** 




The results reported in Table 5 show that the FEIL variable is a very strong and precise 
predictor of the evolution of the unemployment rate at the municipal level. Moreover, the 
results for the unemployment rates are considerably robust and provide greater insights into 
the type of unemployment that the FEIL program impacted and when this impact occurred. 
Hence, it can be seen that in the first month following project approval and the tender 
procedure, coinciding with the expected implementation of the project, nearly all types of 
unemployment were reduced, with a higher point estimate for male, construction, low-educated 
and middle-age registered unemployed workers. 
 
Figure 6. Pre-trends on the Impact of the FEIL Projects on Unemployment. 
  
  
Note: vertical lines on each dot represent a 95% confidence interval. 
 
This profile of the unemployed, who in principle benefited from projects funded by FEIL 
at the local level, is persistent over time and appears to be coherent with the type of project 
approved at the municipal level, many associated with the construction industry (conservation 
and maintenance of buildings, construction of new buildings and facilities for social, sport and 
cultural activities, rehabilitation of public spaces, etc.). Hence, a priori, the FEIL program 
appears to have met its target and reduced local unemployment rates, especially in the 
construction industry, by about 22-25 percent. In short, the first-stage results are robust and 














































which the leads (pre-treatment effects) and lags (post-treatment effects) of the treatment 
variable are plotted for selected unemployment rates, reinforce the empirical strategy and 
appear to confirm that there are no pre-trends that might call into question the results obtained. 
 
 
6.2 Using the FEIL Program to Identify Causal Effects: IV Results 
 
 
In this section I discuss the IV results where the FEIL program is used to instrument total 
unemployment rates.28 Table 6 presents the detailed results for property crimes, while 
Appendix B contains the full set of results for crimes against the person and other types of 
crime. 
In general, the results point to the significant and positive impact of unemployment on 
property crimes. A closer inspection of these results shows that “Robberies” and “Serious car 
thefts” (i.e. offenses including some sort of violence) are the crimes that react most promptly 
to a decrease in unemployment. The highest estimated impact is obtained three periods after 
the project’s expected initiation date, with a sizeable and significant reduction in nearly all 
types of property crime rates. “Serious thefts” and “Damage to property” are the only types of 
property crime not affected, at any point in time, by the decrease in unemployment rates 
associated with the FEIL program. Like the first-stage estimates, Figure 7 plots pre-treatment 
effects for selected property crime types to show that the treatment variable seems to have an 
impact only after its implementation (Figure 7 is, hence, the graphic representation of the 
coefficients presented in Table 6). 
The timing of the estimated impacts of unemployment rates on crime is consistent with 
different size projects being implemented and with a number of periods having to elapse before 
a reaction is observed in crime rates. In Appendix B, the results for crimes against the person 
and other types of crime present a picture that is consistent with expectations and the outcomes 
typically reported in the literature (see Freedman and Owens, 2016) for crimes of this type, 
characterized by a lower degree of economic motivation: that is, a less significant impact of 
unemployment on crime. Quantitatively, and taking into account that the first-stage estimates 
suggested that the FEIL program reduced total unemployment by an average of 16 percent, a 
                                                          
28 In Appendix C, Table C.1 shows the IV results for crime rates obtained when instrumenting the male 
unemployment rate with the FEIL projects. In Appendix E, Table E.1 reports the OLS results. The latter show an 
estimated coefficient that is downwardly biased, becoming negative even in some regressions (results not shown 
here but available upon request), which could result in misleading conclusions being drawn about the relation 
between unemployment and crime if endogeneity is not properly accounted for. 
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one-percent increase in the unemployment rate also increased total property crime by 
approximately 18 percentage points.29 
The results presented up to this juncture seem to indicate that the FEIL program reduced 
unemployment and, as consequence, crime rates fell significantly. Moreover, the first-stage 
estimates (see Table 5) suggest that a particular type of unemployed worker benefited most 
from the program. Although the impact of the FEIL in the first month following the 
implementation of the project is significant for many types of unemployment, the point 
estimates are highest for male unemployed workers engaged in the construction industry, with 
a low level of education and, primarily, aged between 25 and 40 (middle-aged). This profile 
remains consistent when we examine the temporal impacts of the FEIL on unemployment rates. 
As expected, the impact on unemployment is not restricted to just one period but extends in 
accordance with the type of project, primarily those involving local public infrastructure. When 
analyzing the timing of the impact of the FEIL program on unemployment rates, this is found 
to remain strong for male unemployed workers in the construction industry, both middle-aged 
and mature, the results regarding education and age being less distinctive here. 
The second-stage results show that, as a consequence of the reduction in unemployment, 
the crime rate also fell significantly. The impact was immediate in the case of property crimes, 
above all robberies and serious car thefts, but an impact was also found when analyzing the 
(instrumented) lags of the variable of interest. To provide a more precise interpretation of these 
results, it is necessary to identify the various channels that might be operational.30 
 
 
                                                          
29 Note that this broad picture is also obtained when using the three-month approval window (December 2008 – 
February 2009) and only restricting the municipalities to those with more than 500 inhabitants in the IV framework 
(see Appendix D). In addition, Tables E.2 and E.3 and Figure E.1 in Appendix E show the reduced-form effects 
of the FEIL on crime. As expected, the relation is statistically significant and shows a consistent negative sign 
with magnitudes for total property crimes ranging between 12 and 18%, these effects being significant for many 
periods following the beginning of the implementation of the local infrastructures projects. 
30 I performed the main estimation by splitting the sample between municipalities with average number of projects 
above or below 100,000€ for the main types of crime (Table E.4 in Appendix E). Note that splitting the sample 
reduces the number of observations, especially for the subsample of municipalities with projects for less than 
100,000€ and, consequently, this significantly reduces the power of the estimations. In any case, the results 
obtained for the two subsamples are robust and seem to indicate that the overall results hold. Moreover, it seems 
that the results are specifically due to municipalities undertaking large scale projects for which reductions in 




  Table 6. IV Estimates for the Impact of Total Unemployment Rate on Property Crime Rates 
          
Second-stage  Total property Robberies Total thefts Serious thefts Minor thefts  Total car Serious car Minor car Damage to property 
          
                    
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt0) 0.6980** 0.7094* 0.2521 -0.1166 0.4709* 0.4493 0.5486* -0.2118 0.3405 
 
(0.3294) (0.4202) (0.2919) (0.3271) (0.2761) (0.3275) (0.3260) (0.3369) (0.3515) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-1) 0.7700** 1.1464** 0.1847 0.2145 0.1729 0.8361** 0.7907** 0.3071 0.4757 
 
(0.3784) (0.4987) (0.3179) (0.3429) (0.3419) (0.3886) (0.3865) (0.3511) (0.3977) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-2) 0.7928** 0.5138 0.2355 0.4141 0.9574 0.9118* 0.7958* 0.5375 0.0733 
 
(0.3643) (0.4244) (0.3193) (0.4437) (0.5873) (0.4851) (0.4596) (0.3613) (0.3539) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-3) 1.1428** 0.7796* 0.8743 0.8847 1.6748** 0.1741 -0.0619 0.7541* -0.2132 
 
(0.5611) (0.4064) (0.5868) (0.6292) (0.7496) (0.3199) (0.3132) (0.4181) (0.3935) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-4) 0.6847 -0.3722 1.6185** 0.4652 0.6683* 0.5195 0.5567 -0.0085 0.6465 
 
(0.5307) (0.4558) (0.8003) (0.3740) (0.3878) (0.3430) (0.3543) (0.3664) (0.4186) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-5) 0.7743* 0.0442 0.7082* 0.0427 -0.2838 0.7196 0.7291 0.1162 0.6294 
 
(0.3989) (0.4477) (0.3742) (0.2801) (0.3403) (0.4803) (0.5032) (0.3278) (0.4047) 
          
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month_year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# Observations 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 
# Municipalities 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 
Notes: See Table 5. 
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On the one hand, it could be that the FEIL program reduced unemployment and, hence, 
improved general economic conditions in the municipality, reducing the overall incentives to 
commit crimes in the case of both those who obtained a job and those who did not. 
Alternatively, and in keeping with the reasoning and evidence provided by Freedman and 
Owens (2016), if the fall in unemployment only benefited a specific group of individuals (and 
not the whole population of the municipality), this might have increased the supply of criminal 
opportunities for those that failed to benefit from the FEIL project and, as a result, we should 
observe an increase in the crime rates. Given that just the opposite is observed here would seem 
to suggest that, at the very least, there is a counterbalancing force that reduces the crime rate 
when there is a fall in unemployment (even if only a fraction of the total population receives 
direct benefits from the FEIL). 
On the other hand, this counterbalancing force may well constitute the fact that the 
individuals facing the worst ex ante economic conditions (i.e. unemployment), and possibly 
more likely to be involved in illegal activities, were precisely the ones that received a positive 
shock in their economic expectations and, as a result, decided not to engage in illegal activities. 
If this were the case, the results, more in keeping with the findings of the traditional economics 






























It is by no means easy to assess the precise mechanism responsible for the results observed; 
however, advantage can be taken of the detailed crime dataset available to explore further the 
relation at stake. Thus, if an incapacitation effect is operative, and the reduction in crime is due 
to the employment of those individuals more likely to commit a crime, at least two things 
should be observed. First, there should be a significant reduction in certain crime types during 
working hours, given that potential offenders now spend most of their time engaged in legal 
activities. Second, there should also be a reduction in the probability of recidivism with a fall 
in the unemployment rates or, in other words, those individuals who had previously committed 
a crime, but are now the beneficiaries of employment thanks to a FEIL project, are less likely 
to reoffend. 
Table 7 presents the second-stage results when disaggregating crimes according to the time 
of the day when they were committed. The day is divided between working hours (8:00 am – 
17:00 pm) and non-working hours (the rest). As shown in Montolio and Planells-Struse (2016), 
distinct hourly patterns can be associated with the type of crime, making it important to analyze 
each type separately.31 The results obtained provide interesting insights. First, the number of 
robberies (and to a lesser extent minor thefts) seem to fall during non-working hours, when, 
however, such offences generally seem to be more common. Interestingly, the numbers of 
serious car thefts (involving some sort of violence) and minor car thefts (and to a lesser extent 
serious thefts) fall during working hours, which, in principle, would be consistent with an 
increase in the employment of those individuals more likely to be involved in “petty crimes” 
of this type.32 
Note that I do not make any claims in this direction. All I do is provide further evidence 
for the causal impact of unemployment on crime rates which may help in understanding the 
mechanisms at work. As expected, the results for crimes against the person (see Table B.2 in 
Appendix B) are, as before, far less significant and, when significant, the positive impact of 
unemployment on crime rates is found in non-working hours, another logical result for this 
type of crime.
                                                          
31 The authors report three general patterns: first, crimes related to leisure activities (road safety and drug-related 
crimes) present peaks late at night, low rates during the daytime and rates that increase as the evening progresses; 
second, crimes against property (robberies, thefts and damage to property) present high rates during working 
hours, especially for thefts, and low rates at night, with robberies, in particular, presenting a clear peak around 
18:00 (related to the time when people are leaving work on weekdays); and, third, crimes involving violence (such 
as murder, threats, injuries, sexual or gender violence) present rates that peak in the evenings. 
32 Note that the results for minor thefts do not seem to show a distinctive pattern in terms of the impact of 
unemployment on the time the offence was committed. The relationship is positive and significant for both 
working and non-working hours, especially three/four months after a FEIL project has been implemented; 




Table 7. IV Estimates for the Impact of Total Unemployment Rate on Property Crime Rates:  




Total property  
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(Total_Unemp. = FEILt0) 0.6980** 0.3077 0.8466** 0.7094* 0.2593 0.7489* -0.1166 -0.2056 0.0281 
 (0.3294) (0.3018) (0.3704) (0.4202) (0.3778) (0.4340) (0.3271) (0.3397) (0.3288) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-1) 0.7700** 0.0964 1.1619*** 1.1464** 0.0883 1.4528*** 0.2145 0.1158 0.0098 
 (0.3784) (0.3595) (0.4391) (0.4987) (0.4747) (0.5182) (0.3429) (0.3080) (0.3762) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-2) 0.7928** 0.8132** 0.5265 0.5138 0.0876 0.6159 0.4141 0.5731* -0.2483 
 (0.3643) (0.3679) (0.3920) (0.4244) (0.4108) (0.4173) (0.4437) (0.3333) (0.3976) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-3) 1.1428** 0.8278 1.0821** 0.7796* 0.2580 0.8429* 0.8847 0.3912 0.2420 
 (0.5611) (0.5086) (0.5143) (0.4064) (0.3559) (0.4455) (0.6292) (0.4527) (0.3663) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-4) 0.6847 0.7041 0.4529 -0.3722 -0.4094 -0.1925 0.4652 0.5683 0.7866 
 (0.5307) (0.4660) (0.5136) (0.4558) (0.3805) (0.4605) (0.3740) (0.5067) (0.5677) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-5) 0.7743* 0.4492 0.8379** 0.0442 -0.4303 0.3740 0.0427 0.5405 0.1700 

















(Total_Unemp. = FEILt0) 0.4709* 0.2855 0.5020* 0.5486* 0.5665* 0.3467 -0.2118 -0.3842 0.0368 
 (0.2761) (0.3016) (0.2762) (0.3260) (0.3409) (0.3016) (0.3369) (0.4458) (0.2229) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-1) 0.1729 0.1995 0.1289 0.7907** 0.1202 0.3108 0.3071 -0.6449 -0.9649* 
 (0.3419) (0.2900) (0.3640) (0.3865) (0.4043) (0.2926) (0.3511) (0.7264) (0.5002) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-2) 0.9574 0.2843 -0.0363 0.7958* 0.8749** 0.4401 0.5375 0.4450 0.0375 
 (0.5873) (0.3719) (0.3886) (0.4596) (0.4211) (0.3413) (0.3613) (0.3270) (0.3814) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-3) 1.6748** 0.6148 0.9783 -0.0619 0.6892 0.6379 0.7541* 0.7705** 0.0723 
 (0.7496) (0.4738) (0.6240) (0.3132) (0.5074) (0.4021) (0.4181) (0.3673) (0.3042) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-4) 0.6683* 1.5087** 1.1786 0.5567 -0.1632 0.0620 -0.0085 0.6168** 0.4768 
 (0.3878) (0.6378) (0.7503) (0.3543) (0.4024) (0.2901) (0.3664) (0.2978) (0.4347) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-5) -0.2838 0.2474 0.9063** 0.7291 0.4862 0.4421 0.1162 -0.0109 -0.0022 
 (0.3403) (0.3611) (0.4217) (0.5032) (0.3558)  (0.3278) (0.4228)  
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month_Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# Observations 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 
# Municipalities 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 





A final piece of evidence is taken from a different dataset, albeit one also provided by the 
Mossos d’Esquadra. I also make use of an offenders’ dataset for the same period of analysis. 
This dataset provides monthly municipal information about known offenders and, importantly, 
whether they have previous offenses to their name. Thus, in the IV framework, I can estimate 
the impact of unemployment on the probability of recidivism in a given municipality and in a 
given month as a result of the implementation of a FEIL project. Note that this dataset is quite 
distinct in that I am now interested in offenders than in the recorded number of crimes. 
However, while for some crimes it is relatively easy to identify the offender (crimes against 
the person), for others it is more difficult (the case, for example, of property crimes). Moreover, 
although the number of offenders should in principle be correlated with the number of crimes, 
it is in fact more volatile across municipalities, and even more so on a monthly basis. Bearing 
these aspects in mind, Table 8 presents the IV results of the impact of unemployment on known 
offenders and the probability of recidivism for property crimes (see Table B.3 in Appendix B 
for the results regarding crimes against the person and other types of crime). 
Despite obtaining less robust results than in the case of the impact of unemployment on 
crime rates, the results for the probability of repeat offending also show a positive relation with 
unemployment rates. The results provided by the present specification show that the reduction 
in unemployment in the municipalities attributable to the FEIL is associated with a lower 
probability of individuals’ committing repeat offenses. There is a certain parallelism here 
between the results in Table 6 and those in Table 8. Note that a few months after the 
implementation of a FEIL project, unemployment rates fell (especially among male 
construction workers), the total number of property crimes fell (especially during non-working 
hours) and the probability that those committing the crimes were repeat offenders also fell, 
indicating that previous offenders were less likely to reoffend. The results for crimes against 
the person and for other types of crime (drug-related crimes and crimes against road safety) 
only show a positive relation between unemployment and recidivism in the case of gender 
violence (after three months of a project having been implemented) and, especially, in the cases 





Table 8. IV estimates for the Impact of Total Unemployment Rate on Recidivism in Property Crimes 
        
Second-stage  Total property Robberies Serious thefts Minor thefts  Serious car Minor car Damage to property 
        
                
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt0) 0.4935** 0.4307** 0.0935 0.0029 0.0912 -0.0048 0.3489** 
 
(0.2104) (0.1756) (0.1101) (0.0994) (0.0916) (0.0032) (0.1647) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-1) -0.0180 0.2583 -0.1914 -0.0388 -0.0217 -0.0051 -0.0786 
 
(0.2243) (0.1591) (0.1286) (0.1093) (0.0955) (0.0035) (0.1484) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-2) 0.2762 0.1404 0.2968** -0.1279 0.1600* -0.0049 0.0398 
 
(0.2012) (0.1333) (0.1299) (0.1156) (0.0916) (0.0033) (0.1752) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-3) 0.2641 0.3322** -0.0471 -0.0081 0.0815 -0.0049 0.0290 
 
(0.1989) (0.1631) (0.0849) (0.1035) (0.1105) (0.0033) (0.1420) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-4) 0.4927** 0.0211 0.0811 0.1472 0.1811 -0.0049 0.0418 
 
(0.2327) (0.1222) (0.1184) (0.1247) (0.1292) (0.0033) (0.1313) 
(Total_Unemp. = FEILt-5) 0.0748 0.0360 0.2192 -0.0700 0.0026 0.0332 0.1845 
 
(0.2067) (0.1515) (0.1408) (0.1144) (0.0939) (0.0378) (0.1546) 
        
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month_Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# Observations 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 12,396 
# Municipalities 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 





6.3 Placebo Tests 
 
Finally, I perform various placebo tests to confirm the above findings. First, Figure 8 
shows the estimates resulting from the random assignation of municipalities to the months in 
which the projects were approved; that is, I take the actual months but assign municipalities to 
each month randomly.33 I present the results for the main types of unemployment and for total 
property crime rates and crimes against the person. The results of this exercise also hold for all 
types of unemployment and disaggregated crime types. Second, Figure 9 presents the results 
for the same outcome variables but when the projects are randomly assigned to the previous 
year; that is, between December 2007 and March 2008. As expected, in both cases the variable 
of interest has no impact on any of the relevant variables, confirming the identification strategy 
and the results obtained in the previous section. 
 




                                                          
33 In this exercise I assume the same type of project and, hence, I do not take into account varying tender times 
across projects and municipalities. Moreover, the results remain virtually unchanged when I randomly assign 











































Figure 9. Placebo Test (II): Random Assignation of FEIL Projects 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The relationship between unemployment and crime is one that has yet to be clearly resolved in 
the economic literature. The variables interact via such a variety of channels that it is difficult 
to assess the direction of causality between them. In addition, any discussion of the question is 
further complicated by a range of practical problems, including possible measurement errors 
in the variables of interest, the timing of the respective events, and the level of aggregation 
used in testing the relationship. In the face of the obstacles hindering the estimation of the effect 
of unemployment on crime, a promising research strategy has emerged for obtaining unbiased 
estimates of the impact of labour outcomes on crime at the municipal level. This involves 
undertaking analyses of the evolution of municipal crime rates in those municipalities where 
unemployment rates have changed for reasons unrelated to its level of criminality. This is the 
approach exploited in this paper. 
The local investment fund, FEIL, was planned, designed and executed to increase public 
investment at the local level in Spain by financing the construction of new local public works 
infrastructure. The works were scheduled for immediate implementation from the beginning of 
2009, under the control and responsibility of Spain’s local authorities. I show that the timing 
of the approval granted to implement a FEIL project presented by a municipality was random 
or, at least, it was not determined by any variable directly involved in my research strategy or 
which might bias the results presented. Thus, I am able to use the FEIL program to identify the 
causal relation between unemployment and crime. 
The results obtained appear to be in line with the Beckerian view of the relation between 
labour market opportunities and crime rates. An increase in job opportunities increases the 
opportunity cost of committing a crime and, hence, reduces the incentives to engage in illegal 
activities. Based on the analysis reported, I conclude that the FEIL program had a significant 
impact on registered unemployment rates, especially among unemployed male construction 
workers with a low level of education and aged over 25 (middle-aged and mature).  
The significant impact of the FEIL program on labour outcomes has direct consequences 
for the crime rate: thus, the reduction in unemployment rates had a positive effect on crime 
rates, which likewise fell significantly. The results show a clear fall in the number of 
economically motivated crimes and the timing of these effects matched expectations when 
considering the nature (local public infrastructure) of the projects being implemented. 
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the impact on unemployment rates reduced the 
number of (serious and minor) car offenses and robberies, especially those being committed 
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during working hours, and that it also reduced the probability that individuals committing 
property crimes were repeat offenders. Both trends are compatible with a possible 
incapacitation effect: that is, if the individuals who ex ante were exposed to the worst economic 
conditions (i.e. unemployment) and, as a result, more likely to engage in criminal activities, 
were the ones that actually benefited from the FEIL program, then they would have seen their 
labour opportunities improve and would be less likely to engage in illegal activity. Note that 
the results reported here coincide with a period of incipient economic crisis, which started when 
unemployment rates were relatively low (at least by Spanish standards) and there was some 
“margin” for the labour market to absorb this initial impact. Although the results control for 
possible fluctuations attributable to the economic cycle, by means of time fixed effects, the 
results may have been different (probably strengthened) if labour market conditions had 
differed. 
In conclusion, the outcomes reported here should go some way to improving our  
understanding of the social impact of public investment policies, especially at the local level 
where the benefits and costs of any public action are more readily perceived and borne by 
citizens. Moreover, the research strategy adopted verifies the robustness of the causal relation 
between unemployment and crime and, hence, improves the much needed definition of social 
policy objectives that can be transferred into policies that promote investment in infrastructure 
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